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WARRANTLESS MURDER SCENE SEARCHES IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MINCEY v. ARIZONA
In a series of cases culminating in State v. Mincey, the Supreme
Court of Arizona developed a "murder scene search exception" to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement.2 Within broadly defined
limits, the exception permitted warrantless searches at murder scenes3
and locations of serious personal injury where foul play was suspected.
Only Arizona explicitly attempted to fashion a specific murder scene
search exception. Considerable case law from other jurisdictions, how-
ever, implicitly supports a general murder scene search exception.4 In
1. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Warrantless searches are "'per se unreasonable. . . subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). The
Supreme Court has recently phrased this requirement in less absolute language. See Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979) ("ITlhis Court has interpreted the amendment to include the
requirement that normally searches of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant
issued in compliance with the warrant clause."); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979)
("[A] warrant is normally a prerequisite to a search unless exigent circumstances make compliance
with this requirement impossible.").
There are numerous recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search of first class letter mail); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of automobile); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974) (third party consent search); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search inci-
dent to custodial arrest); Almedia-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border search);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970) (search of moving vehicle); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seizure of evidence in plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit of fleeing suspect); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (inven-
tory search of automobile); Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (prevention of loss or
destruction of evidence); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport searches).
See generally Haddad, Well-DelineatedExceptions, Claims ofSham, and Fourfold Probable Cause,
68 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 198 (1977) (arguing that exceptions to the warrant requirements are
neither few nor well-delineated).
3. "Murder scene," in this note, refers to the general location where a murdered or severely
wounded victim is found. Thus, when a victim is discovered in one room of a house, the "murder
scene" encompasses the entire premises as well as the particular room.
4. See notes 15-52 infra and accompanying text.
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Mincey v. Arizona,5 the United States Supreme Court found Arizona's
exception inconsistent with the fourth amendment.6 Mincey, however,
is factually atypical.7 The case presents perhaps the least favorable rec-
ord possible for sanctioning a warrantless murder scene search. Conse-
quently, Mincey's impact on the prior case law from other jurisdictions
is uncertain.
Section I of this Note, in three parts, examines pre-Mincey murder
scene search case law. Part A details the cases establishing implicit
murder scene exceptions to the warrant requirement. Part B concerns
the minority view, pre-Mincey, which more strictly enforced the war-
rant requirement. Part C reviews the emergence of Arizona's murder
scene exception in the cases leading to Mincey. Section II, also in three
parts, discusses Mincey itself. first, the treatment of the case by the
Arizona Supreme Court, next, the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court, and third, the applicability of other warrant require-
ment exceptions to the facts of the case. Analyzing Mincey's impact on
both prior and subsequent case law, Section III first considers the im-
plications of Michigan v. Tyler,' an apparently inconsistent case de-
cided just three weeks before Mincey. Parts B and C discuss the
tensions between Mincey and Tyler in the context of the two principal
issues presented by a murder scene search exception case-the basis for
initial entry and the scope of the subsequent search. Part C concludes
with a suggestion for reconciling Tyler and Mincey. Finally, Part D
briefly discusses the possibility of Mincey as an obstacle to the issuance
of search warrants to investigate murder scenes.
I. PRE--,INcEYMURDER SCENE SEARCH CASES
A. Stretching the Emergency Exception.- The Majority View
Warrantless murder scene searches confront courts with two primary
issues: (1) Is there any basis for the initial warrantless entry?9 (2) Did
the investigation at the murder scene exceed the allowable scope of a
5. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
6. Id at 395.
7. See note 259 infra and accompanying text.
8. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
9. If the initial entry to the premises is illegal, subsequent seizures are also invalid. Thus,
the entry issue can be dispositive of the search's validity. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479-87 (1963).
[Vol. 58:367
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warrantless search following a legitimate emergency entry?' 0 To sanc-
tion initial warrantless entry, pre-Mincey courts relied most frequently
on an emergency doctrine."l The most common fact pattern presented
by these cases comprises reports of homicide,12 suicide, 13 or serious vio-
10. A search lawful at its inception may become invalid if it exceeds its allowable scope. See
State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 605-06, 201 N.W.2d 153, 157-58 (1972).
11. Other than consent searches, all exceptions to the warrant requirement derive from a
pragmatic recognition that exigent circumstances sometimes demand warrantless action. See Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); note 2 supra. It is only recently, however,
that the Supreme Court has recognized a specific "emergency" exception. See Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). Despite the absence of a
Supreme Court definition, lower courts employed an "emergency" exception to sanction warrant-
less entry and search. See. e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956). See generally
Bacigal. The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 249 (1975); Mas-
colo. The Emergen;' Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amend-
ment 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419 (1973); Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and
the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 571 (1975).
Mascolo defines the emergency exception as follows:
Law enforcement officers may enter private premises without either an arrest or a search
warrant to preserve life or property, to render first aid and assistance, or to conduct a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, provided they have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that there is an urgent need for such assistance and protective action, or to promptly
launch a criminal investigation involving a substantial threat of imminent danger to ei-
ther life, health, or property, and provided, further, that they do not enter with an ac-
companying intent to either arrest or search.
Mascolo, supra at 426.
12. See United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1972); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Pope v. State, 367 So. 2d 998, 1000
(Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Retowsky v. State, 333 So. 2d 193, 195 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); Knight v.
State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41, 276 So. 2d 624, 626 (1973); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602 (Alaska
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 408, 489 P.2d 44, 45
(1971); People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 639, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25 (1974); People v.
Williams, 557 P.2d 399, 401 (Colo. 1976); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 488 (Del. 1967); People v.
Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624, 626, 350 N.E.2d 276, 277-78 (1976); People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d
36, 38, 335 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1975); Maxey v. State, 251 Ind. 645, 647-48, 244 N.E.2d 650, 652
(1969); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Me. 1977); Fellows v. State, 13 Md. App. 206, 207-
08, 283 A.2d 1, 2 (1972); State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 10-11, 139 N.W.2d 490,499, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo. 1970); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438,
442-43, 236 A.2d 377, 379 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d
553, 555-56, 378 N.E.2d 99, 100, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (1978); People v. Danziger, 41 N.Y.2d
1092, 1092-93, 364 N.E.2d 1125, 1126, 396 N.Y.S.2d 354, 354-55 (1977); People v. Neulist, 43
A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Hunter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 44, 44-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Corbett v. State,
493 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 389-90, 271 S.W.2d 643, 646, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 837 (1954); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 245-46, 276 A.2d 18, 21, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965
(1971); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 307-08, 249 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1977); State v. Pires, 55 Wis.
2d 597, 600-01, 201 N.W.2d 153, 155 (1972); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 183, 170 N.W.2d
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lence. 4 Courts also have included under the emergency doctrine less
immediately dramatic circumstances that turned out, after police arri-
val, to demand urgent action. 15 Whenever it was remotely possible for
police to reasonably believe that warrantless entry was necessary to
save or protect life, courts invoked the emergency doctrine. 6 Even
755,758 (1969); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 128 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1964); Lonquest v. State,
495 P.2d 575, 577 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
13. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 322,518 P.2d 570, 572 (1974); Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d
364, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
14. See United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972); People v. Hill, 12
Cal. 3d 731, 742, 528 P.2d 1, 10-11, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 402 (1974); People v. King, 54 111. 2d 291,
294-95, 296 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1973); State v. Brothers, 4 Or. App. 253, 254, 478 P.2d 442, 443
(1970).
15. Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (court found legitimate
emergency search when police went to defendant's home to inform anyone there that defendant
had been rescued from suicide and were unable to get any response from a person whose feet they
could see through window); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 392-93, 204 A.2d 76, 78-79 (1964) (dis-
covering a body in the back yard of defendant's house and a trail of blood leading from the body
to the house, police looked through a window, saw a person's feet, were unable to arouse that
person, and forcibly entered); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784, 787-88, 544 P.2d 417, 420 (1975) (ar-
resting defendant when he came to the door of his apartment, police noticed a bloodstain on the
rug inside, entered and searched, observing more blood, bloody clothing, and bedding); State v.
Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 307-08, 506 P.2d 892, 894 (1973) (responding to an emergency call,
police arrived, observed a person within the premises in obvious distress, failed to attract person's
attention to gain entry, and entered).
Some courts have held that the possibility that the murderer might still be at large in the area of
the murder scene was sufficient to permit warrantless entry. United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972) (responding to report of violent fight in a hotel, police arrived, found
victim severely wounded, and received information that victim's companion had fled upstairs);
Fellows v. State, 13 Md. App. 206, 283 A.2d 1 (1971) (police arrived and found victim lying in
pool of blood and bloody footprints leading upstairs); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 378
N.E.2d 99, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1978) (responding to report of fatal stabbing, police found blood-
stains in snow outside an apartment building, found a bloody trail leading into the building,
received reports from neighbors of fight in defendant's apartment, and entered defendant's apart-
ment with a passkey).
16. It appears that only one court has held that the initial entry violated the fourth amend-
ment. Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1971). Police, however, learned before entry
that the victim had been removed by an ambulance driver and that there was no one else in the
house. Id Reports of a homicide, suicide, or serious violence, see notes 11-14 supra, are perhaps
self-evident emergencies. This was the attitude of then Judge Burger in Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
[T]he business of policemen and firemen is to act, not to speculate or meditate on
whether the report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act
with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently
dead often are saved by swift police response.
Id (emphasis in original) (Burger, J., concurring).
Some courts held that entry was valid under the "emergency" exception, see note II supra, See
People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 755-56, 528 P.2d 1, 20, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 412 (1974); People v.
Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1003-04, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 396 (1974); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/6
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when police did not enter the murder scene premises immediately upon
arrival, courts found the procrastinated entry valid under the emer-
gency doctrine. 17
486, 489 (Del. 1976); Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Maxey v.
State, 251 Ind. 645, 650, 244 N.E.2d 650, 653 (1969); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395, 204 A.2d 76,
80 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965); State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 12, 518 P.2d 151, 153
(1974); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 556-57, 378 N.E.2d 99, 101, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737-38
(1978); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 310-12, 506 P.2d 892, 896 (1973).
Other courts did not follow the "exception" analysis, see note 1 supra, but instead ruled that the
emergency made the entry reasonable. See United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 762 (8th Cir.
1972); United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602
(Alaska 1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); People v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 300, 296 N.E.2d
731, 736 (1973); People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624, 630, 350 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1976); People v.
Clayton, 34 111. App. 3d 376, 378-79, 339 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (1975); People v. Brooks, 7 Iln. App.
3d 767, 776-77, 289 N.E.2d 207, 213-14 (1972); Wilson v. State, 247 Ind. 454, 458-59, 217 N.E.2d
147, 150 (1966); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1197-1201 (Me. 1977); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J.
438, 444-45, 236 A.2d 377, 381-82 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); People v. Mitchell, 39
N Y.2d 173, 177-80, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609-11, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248-50, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953,
(1976); Hunter v. State, 496 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d
940, 945-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 250-51, 276 A.2d 18, 25 (alterna-
tive holding), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 201 N.W.2d 153,
157 (1972); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 194, 170 N.W.2d 755, 764-65 (1969); State v. Hoyt,
21 Wis. 2d 284, 295-97, 128 N.W.2d 645, 651-52 (1964).
One court relied on the "hot pursuit" doctrine to sanction warrantless entry. Fellows v. State,
13 Md. App. 206, 208-10, 283 A.2d 1, 3 (1971). See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Two Alabama courts held that report of a homicide and the police officers' observations at the
scene on arrival established probable cause to make a warrantless entry, which, when coupled
with statutory authority to make a warrantless entry to effect a felony arrest, justified the subse-
quent search. See Pope v. State, 367 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Retowsky v. State,
333 So. 2d 193, 199 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976).
In several cases, the court did not discuss the legitimacy of the initial entry although facts and
circumstances sufficient to bring the entry within the emergency doctrine appeared in the record.
See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 601-03 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); Peo-
ple v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25-27 (1974); People v.
Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 866-71, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659, 659-62 (1973); People v. Williams, 557
P,2d 399, 401-05 (Colo. 1976); People v. Johnson, 32 111. App. 3d 36, 40-41, 335 N.E.2d 144, 148-49
(1975); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 210 (Me. 1969); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 948-50
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
17. See People v. Clayton, 34 Ill. App. 3d 376, 377-79, 329 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (1975). The
victim's mother reported her as missing and also reported the threatening behavior of the victim's
estranged husband. Police went to defendant-husband's apartment but received no response to
their knocks although they did hear some movement inside the apartment. Police then returned to
the mother's apartment but brought her back with them to defendant's apartment when they dis-
covered that she had a key to defendant's apartment. Using this key, they entered and searched.
The court held this entry valid under the emergency doctrine. Id
State v. Sutton. 454 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo. 1970). After arriving at the scene, the first arriving
police officer, who already knew that an ambulance driver had removed the victim to a hospital
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Often it was the eventual defendant who notified police of the homi-
cide 8 or admitted police' 9 to the murder scene. Courts in these cases
and had reported that no one else was in the house, waited for the sheriff to arrive before entering.
The court used the emergency doctrine to find the entry reasonable. Id
State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 442-43, 236 A.2d 377, 379-80 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035
(1968). In response to the first arriving police officer's knock, defendant answered the door ap-
pearing groggy, crying, and wearing blood-caked pajamas. Defendant told this officer that he had
killed his wife. The officer then went back to his patrol car and radioed for help. While waiting
for the other officers to arrive, he kept watch outside the house. After the additional officers
arrived, they knocked again at the front door. When defendant appeared at the door, the officers
asked what had happened and where the victim's body was located. Only after defendant an-
swered did police enter. The court found exigent circumstances to be one basis for the entry and
search. Id at 443-44, 236 A.2d at 381-82.
Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 943-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Police were initially alerted to
the homicide at approximately 3:00 a.m. After some preliminary investigation at defendant's resi-
dence, police first entered the house and discovered the victim's body sometime before 6:30 a.m.
At 10:30 a.m. they again entered, accompanied by a district attorney, observed the body, and
departed. In the early afternoon, after defendant's arrest, police made a third entry and searched
the house. All entries were warrantless. The court found that this last warrantless entry was
within the rationale of the emergency doctrine. Id at 945-48.
Two cases concern searches in hotels. In State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 518 P.2d 151 (1974), a
murder victim was found in Room 83. After two and one-half hours of investigation and several
attempts to rouse the occupant of Room 82, police used a passkey to enter the room and discov-
ered defendant with evidence. Id at 12, 518 P.2d at 152. The court found the entry valid under
the emergency doctrine. Id at 13, 518 P.2d at 152-55. The cause of the search in People v. Mitch-
ell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cer. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976), was a
missing hotel chambermaid. Helping the management of the hotel make several progressively
more thorough searches, police entered defendant's room with a passkey and observed a reddish
brown stain on the rug. Prompted to search further, they found the maid's butchered body in a
closet. Id at 175, 347 N.E.2d at 608, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 247. The court held that the entry was valid
under the emergency doctrine. Id at 177-80, 347 N.E.2d at 609-11, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 248-50.
People v. Brooks, 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207 (1972), further indicates the pragmatic and
expansive application of the pre-Mincey emergency doctrine. An apartment building manager
and janitor reported smelling the odor of decomposing flesh. They also reported that one occu-
pant of the building had been missing for some time under unusual circumstances. The court
found that police entry into the apartment shared by the victim and defendant was a legitimate
emergency entry because the odor could have been caused by the rotting flesh of a living person,
Id at 775-77, 289 N.E.2d at 213-14.
The court in Condon v. People, 176 Colo. 212, 489 P.2d 1297 (1971), took a contrary position,
In declining to find a legitimate emergency entry, the court might have been influenced by the fact
that the supposed smell of death turned out to be the odor of brewing mescaline. Id at 214-15,
489 P.2d at 1298. The court held that the detection of an odor which might be that of a decompos-
ing body does not create, in and of itself, an emergency sufficient to justify a warrantless search.
Id at 218-19, 489 P.2d at 1300.
The court in State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978), a post -Mincey case, mentioned the
smell of death as one factor in justifying forcible entry under the emergency doctrine. Id at 263-
69. See notes 186-90 infra and accompanying text.
18. Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41, 276 So. 2d 624, 626 (1973); State v. Duke, 110 Ariz.
320,322, 518 P.2d 570, 572 (1974); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659,
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sometimes held that a defendant thus consented to warrantless entry20
or search or both.2 t Courts also found consent to enter and search if
defendant initiated police investigation by contacting a third party who
in turn notified police.22 In addition, courts inferred consent to enter
and search from defendants' cooperation with police or from their fail-
ure to object to the police investigation.23
A finding that a search was consensual also provides the basis for the
second primary issue raised by a warrantless search, the permissible
659 (1973); People v. Danziger, 41 N.Y.2d 1092, 1092-93, 364 N.E.2d 1125, 396 N.Y.S.2d 354, 354-
55 (1977); Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d
921, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 245-46, 276 A.2d 18, 21, cer. denied,
404 U.S. 965 (1971).
19. Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 42, 276 So. 2d 624, 627 (1973); State v. Duke, 110 Ariz.
320, 322, 518 P.2d 570, 572 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 408, 489 P.2d 44, 45 (1971);
People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659, 659 (1973); State v. Gosser, 50
N.J. 438, 442-43, 236 A.2d 377, 379 (1967); cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); People v. Danziger,
41 N.Y.2d 1092, 1092-93; 364 N.E.2d 1125, 1126, 396 N.Y.S.2d 354, 354-55 (1977); Allen v. State,
536 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 922 (rex. Crim.
App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
20. See cases cited notes 18-19 supra.
21. Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 42, 276 So. 2d 624, 627 (1973); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J.
438, 445-47, 236 A.2d 377, 381 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); Allen v. State, 536
S.W.2d 364, 369-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
When justifying initial entry on the basis of consent, courts did not inevitably justify the subse-
quent search on the same basis. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); People v.
Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1973); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 350
N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241,276 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
965 (1971); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972). For the
rationale authorizing the search in these cases, see notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text.
Persons other than the defendant may give consent to search. "[A] third party who possess[es]
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected," may consent to search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). In two
cases, the court found third party consent. In People v. Swansey, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1016-18,
379 N.E.2d 1279, 1280-81 (1978), defendant's nine-year-old brother brought police into the house
and gave them permission to search. Id The court in People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 151, 153-
54, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180, 183 (1973), relied on consent given by defendant's 20-year-old son to
justify the initial entry. Id
22. Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 576, 578 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972) (de-
fendant called local telephone operator who notified police); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 308,
309-10, 249 N.W.2d 800, 803, 804 (1977) (defendant requested the neighbors call police).
In Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 389-91, 406, 271 S.W.2d 643, 646-47, 656 (1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954) the court indicated that notice by defendant's attorney, who discov-
ered the killing, notified police, and brought defendant to the police station, could be construed as
consent to enter and search. Id
23. See Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Thompson v. McManus,
377 F. Supp. 589, 595 (D. Minn. 1974).
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scope.24 The nature and content of the consent determine the allowa-
ble scope." Resolution of the scope issue was even more straightfor-
ward when police seized evidence in plain view following a valid entry
to the murder scene,26 because operation of the plain view exception
obviated any need to consider allowable scope.27 When a court is un-
able to rely on plain view or consent, however, the exigencies that jus-
tify initiation of a warrantless search establish the constitutional limits
on its scope.28 Pre-Mincey case law reveals three facets to the scope of
24. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
25. See cases cited note 21 supra. Seegenerally 2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 624-35
(1978).
In People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25-27 (1974),
defendant consented to a police search for the murder weapon by telling police where the weapon
could be found. The court, however, did not find that other items seized at the same time were
seized pursuant to a consent search, but found an alternative basis for the other seizures. Id
In State v. Johnson, 14 Or. App. 49, 50-57, 511 P.2d 1258, 1259-62 (1973), defendant gave police
permission to search his residence. The court construed this to mean "dwelling" which by statu-
tory definition did not include defendant's garage, and declared the search of the garage invalid.
Id
In State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 609, 201 N.W.2d 153, 160 (1972), the court held that defend-
ant's husband's call for an ambulance did not constitute consent to an unlimited warrantless
search of the house. Id
26. Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602 (Alaska 1968), ceri. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969);
People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 755, 528 P.2d 1, 20, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 412 (1974); People v.
Eckstrom, 43 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1003-04, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 396 (1974); Patrick v. State, 227 A,2d
486, 489-90 (Del. 1967); Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789, 791-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); People
v. Lovitz, 39 INI. App. 3d 624, 628, 350 N.E.2d 276, 281 (1976); People v. Clayton, 38 I11, App. 3d
376, 379, 339 N.E.2d 783, 785 (1975); People v. Brooks, 7 IU. App. 3d 767, 777, 289 N.E.2d 207,
214 (1972); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 250-51, 276 A.2d 18, 25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
See also Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 396-97, 204 A.2d 76, 81 (1964) (plain view basis for only
some of the evidence seized), cer. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 445-47,
236 A.2d 377, 381 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 966 (1968) (plain view an alternative holding);
State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 194, 170 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1969) (plain view applied to only
one of three searches).
27. The plain view exception does not apply until a search is already in progress and cannot,
by itself, validate initial intrusion into a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. Plain view
supplements priorjustification for the search; therefore, officers must be searching under authority
of a search warrant, consent, or another warrant clause exception. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1971). The rule is that "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has the right to be in that position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced
into evidence." Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). A plurality of the Supreme
Court has taken the view that the plain view exception is restricted to inadvertent discoveries.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971). See State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super.
570, 380 A.2d 728 (1977), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1032 (1978). See generally I W. LA FAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE 240-48 (1978).
28. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
454-55 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
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a warrantless murder scene search: (1) initiation, the interval between
police arrival and entry and the beginning of the search; (2) duration,
the length of time that the search may continue; and (3) extent, the
areas that may be searched. In general, the courts did not require that
the search begin immediately after entry.2 9 Often the first arriving of-
ficers were not competent to investigate the crime fully. 3° Similarly,
some courts approved searches delayed until an autopsy report was
available.3t Nevertheless, in the majority of the pre-Mincey cases po-
lice initiated the search almost immediately after entry32 and termi-
(1967). "[W]e have refused to permit use of articles the seizure of which could not be strictly tied
to and justified by the exigencies which excused the warrantless search." Id at 310 (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
29. See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602-03 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039
(1969); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44,46-47 (1971); People v. Superior Court,
41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 639-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25-27 (1974); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192,
1197 (Me. 1977); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 210 (Me. 1969); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d
150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 181 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 946-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475
S.W.2d 938, 948-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 390-91, 398-99,
406, 271 S.W.2d 643, 647, 651-52, 656 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954); State v. Oakes, 129
Vt. 241, 245-53, 276 A.2d 18, 21-25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d
575, 577 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
30. See Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41, 276 So. 2d 624, 626 (1973); Stevens v. State, 443
P.2d 600, 601-03 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784,
788-89, 544 P.2d 417, 420-21 (1975); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178,
180-81 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
31. See State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 206 (Me. 1969) (second, separate search made after
autopsy results known); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 181 (1973)
(same).
32. See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963);
Pope v. State, 367 So. 2d 998 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979); Retowsky v. State, 333 So. 2d 193 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1976); State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); People v. Superior Court, 41
Cal. App. 3d 636, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1974); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr.
659 (1973); People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976); People v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 296
N.E.2d 731 (1973); People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624,350 N.E.2d 276 (1976); People v. Johnson,
32 Ill. App. 3d 36, 335 N.E.2d 144 (1975); People v. Brooks, 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207
(1972); Maxey v. State, 251 Ind. 645, 244 N.E.2d 650 (1969); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192
(Me. 1977); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965);
State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784, 544 P.2d 417 (1976);
People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 378 N.E.2d 99, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1978); People v. Neulist, 43
A.D.2d 150, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973); Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241,276 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); Kelly
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 201 N.W.2d 153
(1972); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284,
128 N.W.2d 645 (1964); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
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nated it -within several hours.33 It appears that the practical
requirements of the particular investigation were the effective limits on
the duration of warrantless murder scene searches in these pre-Mincey
cases. Some courts evidenced this pragmatic approach by approving
more than one warrantless search of the murder scene.34 Often these
courts characterized the separate searches as part of a continuous inves-
tigation,35 even when the police neglected to maintain control over the
murder scene premises during the nonsearch period. 6 The needs of
33. See United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Pope v. State, 367 So. 2d 998 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979); Retowsky v. State, 333 So. 2d 193 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); State v. Duke, 110
Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974);
People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1974); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1973); People v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 296 N.E.2d 731 (1973);
People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624, 350 N.E.2d 276 (1976); People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36,
335 N.E.2d 144 (1975); People v. Brooks, 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207 (1972); Maxey v.
State, 251 Ind. 645, 244 N.E.2d 650 (1969); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192 (Me. 1977); State v.
Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 966 (1965); State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d
481 (Mo. 1970); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 236 A.2d 377 (1967), ceri. denied, 390 U.S. 1035
(1968); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 378 N.E.2d 99, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1978); People v. Dan-
ziger, 41 N.Y.2d 1092, 364 N.E.2d 1125, 396 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1977); Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d 364
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972); State v. Hoyt, 21
Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1006 (1972).
34. Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41-42, 276 So. 2d 624, 626-27 (1973); Stevens v. State,
443 P.2d 600, 601-03 (Alaska 1968), cer. denied, 394 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz.
407,409-10,489 P.2d 44,46-47 (1971); People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-41, 116
Cal. Rptr. 24, 25-27 (1974); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 208 (Me. 1969); State v. Thompson,
273 Minn. 1, 18-25, 139 N.W.2d 490, 504-08, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 814 (1966); People v. Neulist,
43 A.D.2d 150, 154-56, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183-85 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 923-24
(Trex. Crim. App. 1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 947-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown
v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 948-50 (rex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 248-52, 276
A.2d 18, 23-25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 313, 506 P.2d
892, 897 (1973).
35. State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 210 (Me. 1969); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 154-
55, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 184 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 924 (rex. Crim. App. 1973);
Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 947 (rex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 276
A.2d 18, 25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
36. See Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt.
241, 251-52, 276 A.2d 18, 25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
Other courts held that police departure from the murder scene did not necessitate the issuance
of a warrant before further searches. See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 601-03 (Alaska 1968);
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47
(1971); People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25-27 (1974);
Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 948-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App.
306, 313, 506 P.2d 892, 897 (1973). But see Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1972);
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the particular investigation also seem to be the effective limit on per-
missible extent of a pre-Mincey warrantless murder scene search.
Courts sanctioned searches of areas beyond the room where the body
was discovered,37 of drawers,38 wastebaskets, 39 papers,40 closets, 4I and
entire houses.42
These pragmatically established limits on the scope of warrantless
State v. Brothers, 4 Or. App. 253, 256-60, 478 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1970); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d
303, 314-16, 249 N.W.2d 800, 806-07 (1977); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 195-96, 170
N.W.2d 755, 765 (1969).
37. See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860
(1963); Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41, 276 So. 2d 624, 626 (1973); Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d
600, 601 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 322, 518
P.2d 570, 572 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 45-46 (1971); People v.
Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 742 n.8, 756 n.25, 528 P.2d 1, 11 n.8, 20 n.25, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 403 n.8, 412
n.25 (1974); People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-39, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25 (1974);
People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 866-67, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659, 660 (1973); People v. King, 54
Ill. 2d 291, 300-01, 296 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1973); People v. Brooks, 7 III. App. 3d 767, 772-73, 289
N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (1972); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 205-06 (Me. 1969); Davis v. State, 236
Md. 389, 393-94, 204 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965); Fellows v. State, 13
Md. App. 206, 208-09, 283 A.2d 1, 3 (1971); State v. Gosser, 50 N.J. 438, 444-45, 236 A.2d 377,
380-81 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350
N.Y.S.2d 178, 180-81 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 924 (rex. Crim. App. 1973); Cor-
bett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 942
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 389-90, 271 S.W.2d 643, 646-47
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 313, 506 P.2d 892,
897 (1973); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 308-09, 249 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1977); State v. Hoyt, 21
Wis. 2d 284, 297-98, 128 N.W.2d 645, 652 (1964); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 577 (Wyo.), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
38. See Knight v. State, 50 Ala. App. 39, 41, 276 So. 2d 624, 626 (1973); People v. Superior
Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-39, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25 (1974); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App.
3d 865, 866-67, 117 Cal. Rptr. 659, 660 (1973); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Me. 1977).
39. See State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 45-46 (1971); State v. Chapman,
250 A.2d 203, 205-06 (Me. 1969); People v. Neulist, 34 A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180-
81 (1973).
40. See People v. Danziger, 41 N.Y.2d 1092, 1092-93, 364 N.E.2d 1125, 1126, 396 N.Y.S.2d
354, 354-55 (1977); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 389-90, 271 S.W.2d 643, 646-47, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954).
41. See Fellows v. State, 13 Md. App. 206, 208-09, 283 A.2d 1, 3 (1972); State v. Gosser, 50
N.J. 438, 444-45, 236 A.2d 377, 380-81 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); Corbett v. State,
493 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 942 (rex. Crim.
App. 1971).
42. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 322, 518 P.2d 570, 572 (1974); People v. Superior Court,
41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638-39, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25 (1974); People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624,
626, 350 N.E.2d 276, 278 (1976); State v. Chapman, 250 A.2d 203, 205-06 (Me. 1969); People v.
Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 151-52, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180-81 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921,
924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Brown
v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, 942 (rex. Crim. App. 1971); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 389-90,
271 S.W.2d 643, 646-47, ceri. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954).
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murder scene searches plainly exceeded the demands of any reasonable
emergency-in-fact-the period during which police actually knew or
reasonably believed that immediate action was necessary to save or
protect lives or to apprehend a dangerous criminal.43 Instead, these
pre-Mincey courts adopted a murder scene search doctrine based on
the notion that homicide creates a hyper-emergency 4 demanding spe-
cial police responses.4 5 To justify the expansive scope of warrantless
murder scene searches, these courts posited a "right and duty" doc-
trine-a general right to investigate, implicit in the duty of a police
officer and derived from the grave and heinous nature of homicide.46
43. But see notes 71-82 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 US. 860
(1963).
But a warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an
injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.
Id at 212 (Burger, J., concurring). Thompson v. McManus, 377 F. Supp. 589 (D. Minn. 1974).
It is frivolous to claim that in such an emergency situation with an assaulted and dying
lady on their hands and a cooperating husband standing by, the police would have to go
to court for a warrant to search the premises of the very person who was just assaulted
there.
Id at 595; Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). "The report of a homicide or
the existence of circumstances in which an unnatural death could have occurred can. . . consti-
tute an emergency. . ." triggering a right and duty of police to make a warrantless entry. Id at
946-47. State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973). "[ihe mere presence of the
woman's body broadened the permissible scope of a search to as broad as may be reasonably
necessary to ascertain why, how, and by whom the crime had been committed." Id at 313, 506
P.2d at 897.
See generally W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 458-66 (1978); Haddad, Arrest, Search and
Seizure: Six UnexaminedIssues in Illinois Law, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 492, 505-10 (1977). See also
notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
46. See United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1972); Wayne v. United States,
318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Brown v.
Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (W.D. Tex. 1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d
44, 46-47 (1971); People v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 636, 640-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26-27
(1974); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 868-72, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659, 661-62 (1973); People
v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01, 296 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1973); People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36,
44-45, 335 N.E.2d 144, 152 (1975); Maxey v. State, 251 Ind. 645, 649-51, 244 N.E.2d 650, 653-54
(1969); Wilson v. State, 247 Ind. 454, 456-59, 217 N.E.2d 147, 149-50 (1966); State v. Chapman,
250 A.2d 203, 206-12 (Me. 1969); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 484-86 (Mo. 1970); State v.
Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 12-17, 518 P.2d 151, 152-55 (1974); People v. Danziger, 41 N.Y.2d 1092, 1092-
94, 364 N.E.2d 1125, 1126-27, 396 N.Y.S.2d 354, 354-56 (1977); People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173,
177-80, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609-11, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248-50, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); Peo-
ple v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 153-56, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182-85 (1973); Tocher v. State, 501
S.W.2d 921, 924-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 945-48 (Tex. Crim.
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This duty compels prompt and thorough investigation of a homicide
and supersedes the warrant requirement.47 These courts' recognition of
the special seriousness of homicide was evident in their application of
the general "right and duty" doctrine even when justifications based on
the consent48 and plain view49 exceptions were available. Courts in
App. 1973); Brown v. State, 475 S.w.2d 938, 948-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Sanders, 8
Wash. App. 306, 312-13, 506 P.2d 892, 896-97 (1973); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 578-79
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
47. See. e.g.. People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1973).
ITihe officers entered defendant's home in response to his own request for aid. They
were confronted with a potential homicide, and defendant furnished them with conflict-
ing and improbable explanations of his wife's condition. Under these circumstances,
both common sense and good investigative procedures dictated that the police retain
possession of the premises and conduct a prompt and diligent investigation to ascertain
the cause of the victim's death.
Id at 870-71, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 662. Wilson v. State, 247 Ind. 454, 217 N.E.2d 147 (1966).
Hl]t would be an absurd interpretation of the law to say that a police officer informed of a
homicide, should first have to obtain a search warrant to visit the apartment or home
where the victim of the killing lay dead. . . . In this case a man lay dead as a result of
violence inflicted upon him in his own apartment. Any police officer who sees or is
informed of such a condition has not only the right, but the duty, to make an instant and
prompt investigation.
Id at 458, 217 N.E.2d at 149-50. People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973).
[lIn dealing with a homicide the police should be accorded a greater leeway both in
terms of the element of time and in the permissible scope of their investigation. In the
context of this case, the police were not limited to an examination and search of the
immediate area where the body was found (i.e., the bedroom). On the contrary, they had
the right, indeed the duty, to examine the "crime scene," which should be deemed to
include the entire house.
Id at 156, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 185. Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). "[Police]
were admitted to the Brown home by the appellant and ascertained that homicides had been
committed. Under these circumstances, it became the officers' duty to conduct a thorough investi-
gation into the circumstances. Certainly this duty carried with it the right to inspect the premises."
id at 949.
48. See Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686, 690 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Knight v. State, 50 Ala.
App. 39, 42, 276 So. 2d 624, 627 (1973); People v. Wallace, 31 Cal. App. 3d 865, 869-71, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 659, 661-62 (1973); People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 156, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 185 (1973);
Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 250-51,
276 A.2d 18, 24-25, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 578-79
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).
49. See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969);
Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967); Webster v. State, 201 So. 2d 789, 791-92 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1967); People v. Lovitz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 624, 628-31, 350 N.E.2d 276, 279-81 (1976);
People v. Clayton, 34 Ill. App. 3d 376, 377-79, 329 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (1975); People v. Brooks, 7
I11. App. 3d 767, 775-77, 289 N.E.2d 207, 213-14 (1972); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 251, 276 A.2d
18, 24, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971).
Even when pre-Mincey courts did not explicitly rule that seized evidence was in plain view, but
the evidence challenged by defendant's motion to suppress appeared from the court's presentation
of the facts to have been in plain view when the seizure was made, courts invoked the general
"rights and duties" doctrine. See People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36, 44-45, 335 N.E.2d 144, 152
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New York5" and Texas5" further emphasized the special status of the
murder scene by coupling the general "right and duty" to investigate
with the statutory obligations of coroners and medical examiners.
Pre-Mincey case law thus reveals a rationale for warrantless murder
scene searches predicated on a special concern for homicide. The virtu-
ally unanimous approval of warrantless entry when police had an even
remotely reasonable awareness of homicide or possible homicide re-
flects this concern.52 The expansive scope approved for warrantless
murder scene searches also manifests this concern. Although only Ari-
zona courts used the label "murder scene exception, '53 the general
"right and duty" doctrine employed by many pre-Mincey courts can
only be understood with reference to the particular crime of homicide.
B. Stricter Application of the Warrant Requirement: The Minority
View
When evaluating the constitutionality of warrantless murder scene
searches, several courts adhered more strictly to the warrant require-
ment than the majority of pre-Mincey courts.54 Only one of these deci-
sions confronted the first primary issue present in a warrantless murder
scene search, the justification for initial entry-5 In Root . Gauper,56
the Eighth Circuit held that, given the circumstances presented, the
state failed to demonstrate that the initial police entry was valid under
the emergency exception.57 Before police entered defendant's home,
the murder scene, an ambulance driver informed them that he had re-
(1975); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 484-86 (Mo. 1970); State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 13-16, 518
P.2d 151, 153-54 (1974).
50. People v. Neulist, 43 A.D.2d 150, 154, 350 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (1973).
51. Allen v. State, 536 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Tocher v. State, 501 S.W,2d
921, 924 (rex. Crim. App. 1973); Parsons v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 398, 271 S.W.2d 643, 651
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 837 (1954).
52. See note 16 su.pra.
53. See State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482 n.4, 566 P.2d 273, 283 n.4 (1977).
54. See Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th
Cir. 1971); People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1976); State v. Brothers, 4 Or. App. 253, 478
P.2d 442 (1970); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d
597, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969).
55. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
56. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971). The decision affirmed the district court's grant of defend-
ant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, overturning her conviction for manslaughter. Id at 363,
365. See State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1970).
57. 438 F.2d at 364-65.
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moved the victim and that no one else remained in the house.5" Fur-
ther, the first arriving officer waited outside the house for the arrival of
the sheriff before entering.59 The court held that the emergency excep-
tion implicitly requires that police officers have an objectively reason-
able belief in the existence of an emergency before initial entry and that
no evidence in the record indicated the officers in fact believed or had
reasonable cause to believe an emergency existed when they entered
the murder scene.'
Four courts held that warrantless re-entry and search of the murder
scene violated defendant's fourth amendment rights.6 In two of these
cases, police quit the murder scene almost immediately after arrival
without pausing to search, but returned approximately two hours later
for the specific purpose of searching.6 2 Both courts ruled that the state
58. Id at 363.
59. Id at 365.
60. Id at 364-65. In discussing the objective test of reasonableness, the court quoted the
following language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968):
[Iln justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, rea-
sonably warrant that intrusion .... And in making that assessment it is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief' that the action taken was appropriate?
Id 438 F.2d at 364-65. For a concise discussion of the objective test in search and seizure law, see
Note, The Minimization Requirement After United States v. Scott: Myth or Really, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 601, 620 n.96.
61. See Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Brothers, 4 Or. App. 253, 478
P.2d 442 (1970); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1979); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis.
2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969).
62. In Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972), the court reversed the district court's
denial of defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id at 822. The opinion by the court of
appeals, however, does not provide the facts of the case. The Arizona Supreme Court's affirmance
of defendant's conviction for aggravated assault details this information. State v. Sample, 107
Ariz. 407, 489 P.2d 44 (1971). A neighbor summoned police. When they arrived, they were met
by defendant who spontaneously exclaimed, "'My God, I killed my wife."' Police checked the
residence, discovered the corpse, placed defendant under arrest, and then left immediately to take
defendant into custody. About two hours later, they returned to defendant's residence and made a
warrantless search. Id at 408, 489 P.2d at 45-46.
In State v. Brothers, 4 Or. App. 253, 478 P.2d 442 (1970), the local chief of police, acting in his
off-duty capacity as an ambulance driver, responded to a call to go to defendant's residence. De-
fendant accompanied the victim, his wife, to the hospital in the ambulance. While at the hospital,
the police chief arranged with the state police to have an officer go to defendant's apartment and
lock it up. The state police made no search and brought the apartment key to the chief at the
hospital. Approximately two hours later the chief returned to defendant's apartment to search for
evidence. The chief had obtained neither a warrant nor defendant's consent. Id at 254-55, 478
P.2d at 443.
Washington University Open Scholarship
382 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:367
failed to show that the warrantless re-entry fell within any recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or that exigent circumstances
otherwise excused the failure to obtain a search warrant. 63 In Kely v.
State' and State v. Davidson,65 re-entry occurred, respectively, one
and three days after prior, legitimate warrantless murder scene
searches.6 6 In Davidson, the court held the second search invalid, find-
ing no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless re-entry. 67 Re-
jecting the state's only argument supporting the warrantless re-entry,
the Kelly court held that the third parties who consented to the re-entry
and second search lacked authority to do so.6"
In People v. Williams,69 and State v. Pires,7 ° the courts dealt with the
second primary issue, the permissible scope of a murder scene search
following a legitimate warrantless entry.71 Both courts held that the
emergency-in-fact 72 circumscribes the scope of a warrantless murder
scene search.73 In Pires, police responded to a report of a child's body
and a semiconscious woman at defendant's address. Officers entered
the house through an unlocked door, found no one in the house, and
went to the front door to admit a detective. By the time the detective
63. See Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Brothers, 4 Or, App.
253, 256-60, 478 P.2d 442, 443-45 (1970).
64. 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
65. 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969).
66. See Kelly v. State, 75 Wis, 2d 303, 309, 249 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1977); State v. Davidson, 44
Wis. 2d 177, 184, 170 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1969).
67. 44 Wis. 2d at 195-96, 170 N.W.2d at 765.
68. 75 Wis. 2d at 316, 249 N.W.2d at 805-07.
69. 557 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1976).
70. 55 Wis. 2d 597, 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972).
71. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972). Goldenstein was not a murder scene search case, but an appeal of a
conviction for aggravated bank robbery. Police responded to notice of a severe fight in a hotel
lobby. On arrival they found the fatally wounded victim in the lobby. The desk clerk told them
that defendant, apparently wounded, had gone upstairs after the fight, carrying a gun. The clerk
accompanied police to defendant's room and let them in with a passkey. Police observed a bloody
shirt on the bed, but defendant was not in the room. Police then made a thorough search of the
room. Opening defendant's suitcase, they found $12,900 in currency, which was later identified as
stolen from a bank. Id at 1008, 1010. The court held that the search of defendant's suitcase could
not be justified under the emergency exception, which permitted only the warrantless entry and
investigation to discover defendant's absence. Finding that no other exception to the warrant
requirement was applicable, the court ruled the seizure of the money unconstitutional. Id at
1010-I1.
72. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
73. See People v. Williams, 557 P.2d 399, 403-05 (Colo. 1976); State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597,
606, 201 N.W.2d 153, 156-60 (1972).
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arrived, the officers were aware that an ambulance had taken the de-
fendant, her husband, and the victim to the hospital. Returning to the
bedroom, the officers seized a pad of paper containing inculpatory
statements by defendant.74 Both the trial court and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court characterized the return to the bedroom as a "second
search."75 Because the sole justification for the initial entry and "first
search" was emergency aid or apprehension of a criminal, the Pires
court ruled that the "second search"-"[a]fter the officers determined
no one was present, victim or otherwise"-was not within the purview
of the emergency exception.76 The court thus held the seizure of the
pad invalid.77
The prosecution in Williams argued that an exigent circumstance or
murder scene search exception to the warrant requirement justified
seizure of defendant's diary from underneath clothing inside a dresser
drawer.7" Police discovered the diary after defendant had departed and
after they had seized the murder weapon in plain view and secured the
premises.79 The record, according to the court, however, failed to
demonstrate that police reasonably believed that an immediate general
search of defendant's house was necessary to prevent others from being
harmed, to prevent a dangerous criminal from escaping, or to prevent
the loss or destruction of evidence.8 ° In reaching this conclusion, the
court specifically rejected Arizona's murder scene search exception. 1
Broadly stated, the Williams holding requires police to obtain a war-
rant to do more than seize evidence in plain view following a lawful
emergency entry-absent other exigent circumstances-notwithstand-
ing "a valid governmental interest in speedy investigation at the scene
of a recent homicide. ' 8 2
74. 55 Wis. 2d at 600-05, 201 N.W.2d at 155-56.
75. Id at 602, 201 N.W.2d at 156.
76. Id at 606-07, 201 N.W.2d at 157-58.
77. Id at 608-10, 201 N.W.2d at 158-60. The court also rejected the argument that the pad
was in plain view and, therefore, legitimately seized. See note 26 supra. The court noted that the
officers did not see the pad during the first search. Moreover, the inculpatory nature of the state-
ments was in plain view only when the police picked them up and began reading. 55 Wis. 2d at
608-09, 201 N.W.2d at 159.
78. 557 P.2d at 403.
79. Id at 401-02.
80. Id at 403-05.
81. Id at 404 n.l1.
82. Id at 404-05.
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C. Precursors of Mincey in the Arizona Courts
Not fully articulated until the decision in State v. Afince, 83 the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's murder scene search exception emerged in three
pre-Aincey cases, State v. Sample,14 State ex re. Berger v. Super/or
Court, 85 and State v. Duke. 6 Although the court failed to provide de-
tailed analysis of the basis for the exception, 7 the Arizona doctrine is
not simply a particularized application of the more general "emer-
gency" exception.88 The Arizona Supreme Court appeared to regard
warrantless murder scene searches as per se reasonable under the
fourth amendment.8 9
In Sample, defendant's neighbor summoned police. Pausing at the
murder scene only long enough to locate the victim's body, police left
immediately to take defendant into custody. Approximately two hours
later, they returned to search defendant's residence. 90 Although the
court found that a warrant was readily obtainable before the re-entry9t
it nevertheless held that the warrantless re-entry and search were rea-
sonable.92 Further, the court declined to approve the search under any
recognized exception to the warrant requirement and rejected exigent
circumstances as a basis for its holding.93 Instead, the presence of the
83. 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977).
84. 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P.2d 44 (1971).
85. 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974).
86. 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974).
87. See State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482-83, 566 P.2d 273, 283-84 (1977); State v. Duke,
110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 574 (1974); State exrel Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz, 281,
281, 517 P.2d 1277, 1277 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1971).
88. In both Sample and Mincey, the court held that exigent circumstances did not necessitate
the warrantless search. See State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977); State v.
Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409, 489 P.2d 44, 46 (1971). The court did not refer to emergency or
exigent circumstances in either ex rel Berger or Duke. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518
P.2d 570, 574 (1974); State ex rel Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 281, 517 P.2d 1277,
1277 (1974).
89. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 574 (1974); State ex rel Berger v.
Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 281, 517 P.2d 1277, 1277 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407,
409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1971). In Aincey, the court modified this per se approach by limiting
the murder scene exception to searches to determine the cause of death. See State v. Mincey, 115
Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977). The expansive search conducted in Mincey itself, how-
ever, demonstrates the ephemeral nature of this limit. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 389-
90, 394-95 (1978); note 116 infra and accompanying text.
90. 107 Ariz. at 408, 489 P.2d at 45-46.
91. Id at 409, 489 P.2d at 46.
92. Id at 409, 489 P.2d at 46-47.
93. Id
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deceased's body in defendant's residence extinguished any reasonable
expectation of privacy to which defendant might otherwise have been
entitled.94
The specific holding in Sample did not survive federal habeas corpus
review.95 The Ninth Circuit held that failure to obtain a warrant
before re-entry violated Sample's fourth amendment rights.96 The Ari-
zona Supreme Court did not, however, abandon its murder scene doc-
trine. Without providing the facts of the case, the court, in State ex rel.
Berger v. Superior Court,9 7 reversed a lower court's suppression of "the
shell assertedly fired from the murder weapon."98 In a cryptic, per
curiam opinion, the court stated, "Where the police are called to the
scene of a homicide, they may lawfully investigate such portions of the
premises as are reasonably necessary to establish the true facts of the
homicide."99
State v. Duke, 1o the final murder scene search case to precede
Mincey, factually distinguished Sample but applied language from that
case to approve a warrantless search.101 Defendant summoned police,
reporting the victim as a suicide. After removal of the body, police
searched the dwelling.10 2 Although defendant was apparently present
during this search and police initially relied on his story of suicide, the
court explicitly stated that police searched "without permission."' 3
Because police presence at the murder scene was uninterrupted, the
court distinguished Duke from Sample and therefore held the search
legitimate."° Once again, the court made no attempt to justify the
search on the basis of exigent circumstances. 105 Rather, the court again
94. See 107 Ariz. at 409, 489 P.2d at 46. "we find nothing in the Constitution or common
sense which should prevent the police from making a warrantless search of the premises in which
the victim is found dead .. " Id "The traditional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonable and unnecessary invasions of their privacy is not violated
when the premises upon which a deceased victim is found are searched without a warrant." Id at
409, 489 P.2d at 47.
95. See Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1972).
96. Id See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
97. 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974).
98. Id at 281, 517 P.2d at 1277.
99. Id
100. 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974).
101. Id at 324, 518 P.2d at 574.
102. Id at 322, 324, 518 P.2d at 572, 574.
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appeared to find a warrantless search at a murder scene inherently rea-
sonable. 10 6
In these three pre-Mincey murder scene search cases, the Arizona
Court did not specifically consider the two primary issues-justification
106. Id
The victim's joint occupancy, with defendant, of the murder scene premises before the killing
was significant in both Sample and Duke. See State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44,
46-47 (1971):
We find nothing in the Constitution or common sense which should prevent the police
from making a warrantless search of the premises in which the victim is found dead and
this is true even if the suspect exercised joint control of said premises along with the
victim.
. The need for all citizens and particularly potential victims such as this to effective
protection from crime, particularly while in their own home, would indicate that a war-
rantless search of the premises is not made unreasonable or unconstitutional by the fact
that the defendant exercises joint control over the premises.
Id The court quoted part of this language in Duke and added: "[A] contemporaneous warrantless
search of the scene of a crime at the time of the discovery of the body was, we believe, reasonable,
and not made unreasonable and unconstitutional by the fact that the defendant may have shared
possession of the premises with the deceased victim." State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518 P.2d
570, 574 (1974). One commentator reads the language from Sample to find:
Although no court has put in these terms, it is almost as if there were an implied consent-
in-advance by the deceased to enter his premises to investigate in the event of his death,
corresponding to the consent which could be expected if the victim were only injured, so
that even if the co-occupant is the prime suspect he may not by virtue of the death
suddenly claim exclusive possession.
W. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 461 (1978).
The Arizona Supreme Court, however, seemed concerned in Sample and Duke with the rights
of the recently dead rather than consent by the corpse. See W. LAFAVE, supra at 465. Defend-
ants' new status as exclusive occupants of the premises could not suddenly have enlarged their
reasonable expectations of privacy beyond pre-homicide expectations unless one assumes that de-
fendants somehow acquired the victims' expectations of privacy that were not previously shared.
Thus, defendants could gain no added constitutional rights merely by claiming exclusive posses-
sion. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (noting a twofold requirement that
there be an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation be one that society
recognizes as reasonable) (Harlan, J., concurring). It is the inability of anyone else to legitimately
consent to a search-a consequence of newly, and perhaps illegally, acquired exclusive occu-
pancy--that theoretically enhances defendants' fourth amendment rights. Yet, regardless whether
the homicide enhanced Sample's or Duke's fourth amendment rights, the Arizona Supreme Court
appeared to find that the presence of an apparent homicide in defendants' residences extinguished
all reasonable expectations of privacy. See notes 94 and 99 Supra and accompanying text. That
the victim was formerly a joint occupant of the premises with defendant was not crucial to the
court's reasoning. The elaboration of the murder scene exception in State v. Mincey, in which the
victim was an undercover police officer killed in a raid on defendant's apartment, makes this
conclusion clear. See State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482-83, 566 P.2d 273, 283-84 (1977). Thus
the language in Sample and Duke seems more correctly construed as holding that the rights of the
victim to an investigation into the killing outweighed the defendants' fourth amendment rights.
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for initial entry and permissible scope of the search.'" 7 It is unlikely,
however, that either Sample or Duke could have challenged the initial
police entry. The court, it would seem, could have relied on the emer-
gency and consent exceptions to sanction initial entry in both cases. 10 8
In all three cases, the court failed to clarify the scope of a warrantless
search permissible under the murder scene exception; 10 9 the court de-
tailed neither the duration nor the extent of the searches in any of these
decisions. 110
II. MiNcEY v ApzoNA
A. In the Arizona Supreme Court
The decision in State v. Mincey emphatically demonstrates the ex-
pansiveness of the Arizona exception. I  As in Sample and Duke,"t2
the basis for initial entry was not at issue in Mincey;" 3 the issue was the
permissible scope of a search under the murder scene exception." 14 The
warrantless search in MinceyII5 lasted four days, during which investi-
gators examined and inventoried everything in defendant's apart-
ment."16
107. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 11-17 and 18-23 supra and accompanying text. See also State v. Duke, 110
Ariz. 320, 322, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 572, 574 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d
44, 45 (1971).
109. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 322, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 572, 574 (1974); State ex rel.
Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 281, 517 P.2d 1277, 1277 (1974); State v. Sample, 107
Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1971). It is not obvious that the evidence seized in any of
these cases was all in plain view.
110. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 322, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 572, 574 (1974); State ex rel
Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 281, 517 P.2d 1277, 1277 (1974); State v. Sample, 107
Ariz. 407, 409-10, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1971).
111. See notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text.
112. See State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518 P.2d 570,574 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz.
407, 409, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47 (1971).
113. See State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977).
114. The Arizona Supreme Court's statement of its murder scene exception makes clear that
the exception applies to searches rather than entries. The court stated that the exception applies
"where the law enforcement officers were legally on the premises in the first instance." 115 Ariz.
at 482, 566 P.2d at 283.
115. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977), rev'd and remanded sub noma. Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
116. Id at 476, 566 P.2d at 277. The United States Supreme Court opinion gives a more
complete recitation of the facts of the search.
Their search lasted four days, during which period the entire apartment was searched,
photographed, and diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards,
and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they dug bullet fragments
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Police and narcotics officers had raided the apartment intending to
arrest defendant, 1 1 7 and a gun battle ensued in which one of the raiders
was fatally wounded. 13 Defendant and two other occupants of the
apartment were also wounded. 119 The court, as it had in Sample,
found that police had sufficient time to procure a warrant before the
search and found the facts insufficient to justify the search under the
emergency exception. 120 Approving the search nevertheless,12 the Ari-
zona Supreme Court held: When law enforcement officers are lawfully
on the premises at the scene of a homicide or serious personal injury
with the likelihood of foul play, a warrantless search to determine the
circumstances of death, if begun within a reasonable period following
the time officials learned of the murder or potential murder, is constitu-
tional.' 22
B. In the United States Supreme Court
Before the United States Supreme Court, Arizona offered five argu-
ments in defense of its murder scene exception. (1) A defendant by his
crime forfeits reasonable expectations of privacy in the murder scene
out of the walls and floors; they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for
examination. Every item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and
two to three hundred objects were seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to
an exhaustive and intrusive search.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 389 (1978).
117. See Aguz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1403 (1972) (current version at ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3883 (1978)) (authorizing warrantless arrests); AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1972) (cur-
rent version at Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3891 (1978)) (authorizing forcible entry to effect a
warrantless arrest).
118. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 476, 566 P.2d 273, 277 (1977). Prosecutors used the evi-
dence thus collected to obtain murder, assault, and narcotics convictions.
119. Id The shooting incident precluded the raiding officers from searching the apartment. A
local police policy prohibited the raiding officers from investigating their own actions. Brief for
the Respondent at 24, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 388 (1978). This departmental policy necessitated the arrival of a second squad of police
to conduct the search.
120. The court stated that, "[defendant] alleges--correctly---that there were not sufficient facts
to fit within the usual 'exigent circumstances' exception and that there was ample time to secure a
warrant." Id at 482, 566 P.2d at 283.
121. 115 Ariz. at 483, 566 P.2d at 283. The court characterized the issue as whether it should
invoke stare decisis. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472,482, 566 P.2d 273, 277 (1977). "Thus the issue
is whether this Court will adhere to its previous rulings which hold the search of a murder scene
under certain circumstances to be a valid exception to the constitutional warrant requirement."
Id, 566 P.2d at 283.
122. 115 Ariz. at 482-83, 566 P.2d at 283.
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premises.123 (2) The murder scene search, following legitimate entry, is
a de minimis additional intrusion of a defendant's fourth amendment
rights.12 4 (3) A possible homicide presents an emergency situation de-
manding immediate action.'25 (4) A vital public interest demands
prompt investigation of homicides."2 6 (5) The narrow, confining guide-
lines imposed on the Arizona murder scene exception make it constitu-
tionally valid.'27 Unpersuaded, the Supreme Court held: The Arizona
murder scene exception is incompatible with the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, and a warrantless search of a defendant's premises, sim-
ply because a homicide has recently occurred there, is unconstitutional;
the seriousness of the offense under investigation cannot itself create
exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless search. 28
In reaching its decision, the Court did little more than refute each of
the state's arguments. To contend that a defendant, by killing his vic-
tim, forfeits fourth amendment protected expectations of privacy
would, according to the Court, impermissibly convict the defendant
before the gathering of any evidence. 29 The Court controverted the
state's second argument of de minimis additional intrusion in two ways.
Under the search-incident-to-arrest exception established in Chimel v.
Caifornia, "I the lessened expectation of privacy in the arrestee's per-
son resulting from the arrest does not extend to any area beyond the
arrestee's control.13 1 In addition, the Court found untenable the asser-
tion that an intense four day search could qualify as a de minimis in-
123. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978).
124. Id
125. Id at 392-93.
126. Id at 393.
127. Id
128. Id at 395. Because the Court reversed defendant's conviction on the search and seizure
issue and remanded the case to the Arizona courts for retrial, it reached another issue in the case.
The Court found that statements by defendant made during an interrogation in the hospital the
evening of the shooting incident were involuntary and, thus, inadmissible even to impeach. Id at
401-02.
129. Id at 391. The Court asserted that the state was in effect arguing that defendant had
waived his fourth amendment rights. In rejecting this contention, the Court cited Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1978), decided just three weeks before Mincey.
130. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The search-incident-to-arrest rule established by this decision is:
search of the arrested person and the area within his immediate control is permissible without a
warrant, but any broader search of the place of the arrest must be made under authority of a
search warrant. Id at 763, 768.
131. 395 U.S. at 768. See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 391 (1978).
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trusion into defendant's fourth amendment rights.'32 Responding to
the state's contention that a possible homicide generates an emergency
justifying a warrantless murder scene search, the Court restricted the
concept of emergency to include only situations in which police action
is needed to protect or preserve life or to avoid serious injury. 33 The
Court held that the emergency search doctrine could not encompass the
exhaustive four day search in Aincey, and it specifically noted the ab-
sence of exigent circumstances at the time the search began. 3 4 Dealing
with the state's fourth argument, the Court asserted that no criteria
"relevant to the fourth amendment" distinguish the public interest in
prompt solution of homicide from the public interest in prompt solu-
tion of any other serious crime. 35 Exigent circumstances, rather than
public interest in efficient law enforcement, are the bases for exceptions
to the warrant requirement. The Court again cited the state court's
finding that no exigent circumstances were present when the search be-
gan. "'36 The exhaustive four day search, according to the Court, rebut-
ted the state's fifth argument, that the murder scene search exception
was constitutional because of its narrow guidelines. 37 Further, the
Court found that the Arizona exception, despite the state court's guide-
lines, allowed investigating officers to make judgments properly the
function of a neutral and detached magistrate. 138
132. 437 U.S. at 391. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (request by police
officer that driver of car stopped for a traffic violation get out of car is incremental intrusion that
can only be regarded as de minimis).
133. 437 U.S. at 392-93.
134. The Court stated:
[Ilt simply cannot be contended that this search was justified by any emergency threaten-
ing life or limb. All the persons in Mincey's -apartment had been located before the
investigating homicide officers arrived there and began their search. And a four-day
search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be
rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.
Id at 393.
135. Id
136. Id See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
137. 437 U.S. at 394-95.
138. The Court stated:
Indeed, these so-called guidelines are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to
assert. They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such
terms as "reasonable . . . search," "serious personal injury with likelihood of death
where there is reason to suspect foul play," and "reasonable period." It is precisely this
kind ofjudgmental assessment of the reasonableness and scope of a proposed search that
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C. Applicability of Other Warrant Requirement Exceptions
Restricting itself to the merits of Arizona's murder scene exception,
the Supreme Court left final resolution of the admissibility of evidence
seized from Mincey's apartment to the Arizona courts on remand.139
Yet none of the presently recognized exceptions to the warrant
clause,' 40 either singly or in combination, appear sufficient to provide a
constitutional basis for the search. The Supreme Court noted that the
record did not indicate that evidence in Mincey's apartment might be
lost or destroyed, 4' and the Arizona Supreme Court held that there
was ample time to obtain a warrant before the search.'42 Therefore, the
loss-or-destruction-of-evidence exception is unavailing as a basis for
the warrantless search.' 4 3
A second possibility, search-incident-to-arrest, 44 appears to have
only limited usefulness. This exception, which operates only at the
time of arrest and allows search of the arrestee's person and the area
under his immediate control, could not sanction a four day search.
Moreover, the underlying rationale of the exception is protection of the
arresting officer. 45  All occupants of Mincey's apartment, however,
were in custody when investigating officers arrived, and three of the
occupants had been seriously wounded in the gun battle.'
46
The applicability of the plain view exception 147 is problematic. Un-
certainty arises for two reasons: (1) Officers other than those of the
raiding party made the search and all seizures; 148 and (2) The plain
139. Id at 395 n.9. "To what extent, if any, the evidence found in Mincey's apartment was
permissibly seized under established Fourth Amendment standards will be for the Arizona courts
to resolve on remand." Id
140. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
141. 437 U.S. at 394.
142. State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977). Underscoring this point is
the fact that the investigators could have obtained a search warrant by telephone from Mincey's
apartment. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3914(C) (1978).
143. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
144. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
145. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested.
Id at 762-63.
146. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 27 supra.
148. See note 119 supra.
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view exception applies only when the seizing officer's presence on the
premises is otherwise legitimate. 149 Under the emergency exception de-
tailed in fincey, the raiding officers could have seized any evidence in
plain view encountered "during the course of their legitimate emer-
gency activities."' 50 Local police regulations, however, prevented the
raiding party from investigating,' 51 and the search of Mincey's apart-
ment did not begin until after a second party of police arrived.'$2 Ar-
guably, the searching party had no "legitimate emergency activities" to
perform. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Arizona
Superior Court found exigent circumstances confronting the search
party. 5 3 In addition, the Supreme Court appeared to confine "legiti-
mate emergency activities" to assistance of persons in immediate need
of aid and to searches to determine if the killer remained on the prem-
ises or to locate other victims. 54 The raiding officers, however, had
accounted for all persons within Mincey's apartment before the arrival
of the investigating team. 55 Only emergency assistance during re-
moval of the wounded from Mincey's apartment might come within
"legitimate emergency activities."' 156 One could argue, therefore, that
seizure of evidence observed in plain view during supervision of this
removal would be valid under the plain view exception.
Even this narrow application of the plain view exception, however,
may be improper. The exception does not, by itself, authorize entry
into the premises to be searched.'57 The sole function of the investigat-
149. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
150. 437 U.S. at 393. The Court did not define "legitimate emergency activities." See id In
the same paragraph of the opinion that contains the mention of "legitimate emergency activities,"
however, the Court stated, "when police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a
prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the
premises." Id at 392.
151. See note 119 supra.
152. 437 U.S. at-388-89.
153. Id at 394; State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977).
154. See 437 U.S. at 392-93; note 150 supra.
155. Id at 388, 393.
156. Id Only one of the nine raiding officers was injured during the raid. Thus, there were
sufficient police personnel in the apartment after the shooting to render what assistance could be
given the wounded before medical help arrived. It was the raiding party that called for the ambu-
lance. See Brief for the Respondent at 19-24, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Further,
the search party began its investigation before removal of all the former occupants of the apart-
ment. See 437 U.S. at 390; Brief for the Respondent at 25, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978).
157. See note 27 supra.
[Vol. 58:367
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/6
WARRANTLESS MURDER SCENE SEARCHES
ing team was to search Mincey's apartment. They did not enter in re-
sponse to an emergency and their only nonsearch function, supervising
removal of the wounded and the arrested, was incidental to their search
function.' Their very presence in the apartment without a warrant,
therefore, might be invalid. Additional problems with the application
of plain view arise on consideration of the requirement of "inadver-
tence"' 59 posited by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.160 Not only did the investigating team anticipate the
discovery of evidence, it knew its location and intended to seize it.'6 '
Indeed, it would seem improbable that any evidence would be discov-
ered "inadvertently" when police, in a nonemergency situation, go to
the scene of a homicide. In any case, the plain view exception could
not possibly validate a four day search. At best, one can conclude that
only a small portion of the evidence seized from Mincey's apartment
would be admissible under the plain view exception.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MINCEYFOR SUBSEQUENT MURDER SCENE
SEARCH CASES
A. Comparison of Mincey with Michigan v. Tyler
Evaluation of Mincey's impact on pre-Mincey murder scene search
doctrine requires examination of Michigan v. Tyler, 162 an arson case
decided just three weeks before Mincey. Firefighters discovered evi-
dence of possible arson while extinguishing the blaze. Before the
firefighters departed at 4:00 a.m., a police arson investigator made a
cursory search for evidence. Darkness and the condition of the build-
ing frustrated a more thorough search, although the investigator seized
two plastic containers of inflammable liquid.'63 At 8:00 a.m. and 9:00
a.m. that same morning, a fire official charged with determining the
origin of all fires made warrantless, nonconsensual entries into defend-
ant's premises, accompanied on the second visit by the police arson
investigator. The rubble was searched and evidence of arson seized."6
158. See 437 U.S. at 388, 393. See also Brief for the Respondent at 23-25, Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
159. See note 27 supra.
160. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
161. See Brief for the Respondent at 23-25, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
162. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
163. Id at 501-02.
164. Id at 502.
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Reviewing the defendant's conviction for arson, the Michigan Supreme
Court adopted a narrow concept of emergency. The court held that
once firefighters have left the premises they must obtain a warrant for
subsequent entries unless the premises had been abandoned after the
fire. Consequently, the state court suppressed evidence seized during
the 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. searches. 165 The United States Supreme Court,
however, ruled that the Michigan Supreme Court had an unrealistically
narrow view of fire fighting.166 Regarding the later morning entries as
no more than a continuation of the initial legitimate entry to fight the
fire, the Court held: the seizures made during those searches were legit-
imate because entry to fight a fire requires no warrant and once in the
building, fire officials may remain for a reasonable time after the blaze
has been extinguished to investigate its cause.' 67
In contrast to Tyler's expansive "reasonable time to investigate"
standard, Mincey narrowly circumscribes the scope of a legitimate,
warrantless homicide investigation.' 6 Examination of the three facets
of the scope of a warrantless murder scene search-initiation, duration,
and extent' 69 -reveals the tension between Tyler and Mincey. After
Mincey, the limits on initiation and duration appear straightforward.
To be valid, a warrantless murder scene search following an emergency
entry must be coterminous with the emergency-in-fact-the period dur-
ing which the police know or reasonably believe that immediate action
is necessary to save or protect lives or to apprehend a dangerous crimi-
nal.170 No warrantless search may begin or continue after termination
of the emergency-in-fact. '71 Thus, the nature of "legitimate emergency
activity" circumscribes the allowable extent of a warrantless murder
scene search post-Mincey. Police may look into and investigate such
places as are necessary to render emergency aid, locate other victims, or
165. People v. Tyler, 399 Mich. 564, 583-84, 250 N.W.2d 467, 477 (1977).
166. 436 U.S. at 510.
167. 436 U.S. at 510-12.
168. See 437 U.S. at 392-93:
[The Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate
aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a
prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or ifa killer is still
on the premises. . . . And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during
the course of their legitimate emergency activities.
Id
169. See notes 29-51 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
171. See 437 U.S. at 392-93; note 168 supra.
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ascertain whether the killer remains on the premises.172
Tyler, in contrast, does not limit the scope of a warrantless fire scene
investigation to the emergency-in-fact-the fire itself. Under its stan-
dard of a "reasonable" time to investigate, the Court sanctioned war-
rantless searches made four hours after the firefighters extinguished the
blaze and departed. 7 3 Further, Tyler permitted investigators to leave
and re-enter the premises without obtaining a search warrant in the
interim. 174 Finally, nothing in the Court's holding appears to limit the
areas at the fire scene that investigators may search during the reason-
able time period. 175 Under Tyler, therefore, a valid, warrantless fire
scene search is of much broader scope than a valid, warrantless murder
scene search under Mincey.
B. Initial Entry Cases After Mincey
Neither Mincey's narrowness nor Tyler's expansiveness should affect
the precedential value of pre-Mincey case law regarding the justifica-
tion for initial police entry.' 76 Although initial police entry was not at
issue in Mincey, 177 the Court stated the standard for warrantless entry
under the emergency exception: "[Tihe Fourth Amendment does not
bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when
they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate
aid."''17  Nothing in Tyler is inconsistent with this language.'
79
In the wake of Mincey, courts' 80 have continued to apply broad no-
172. See 437 U.S. at 392-93; note 168 supra.
173. See 436 U.S. at 510-12.
174. Id at 511.
175. See id at 510-12.
176. See notes 11-23 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
178. 437 U.S. at 392.
179. 436 U.S. at 509.
180. See United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1210 (4th Cir. 1979) (entry at request of
defendant's landlady who reported defendant missing for several days and an unusual odor com-
ing from his apartment); Grant v. State, 374 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (defendant
reported killing to police); People v. Kepi, 65 Il. App. 3d 327, 327-30, 382 N.E.2d 642, 643-44
(1978) (attempting to substantiate defendant's explanation of his gunshot wound, police observed
bloodstains on floor through an open door); State v. Rogers, 573 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (police received report of dead body at defendant's address). See also United States v.
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1121-22 (Ist Cir. 1978) (entry of yacht found fouled in moorings and appar-
ently abandoned in circumstances that indicated owner might have drowned); United States v.
Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1978) (search of briefcase found in car parked by curb next to
man lying unconscious in street).
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tions of reasonableness and emergency when considering the basis for
initial warrantless entry.' 8' Although the police in State v. Marint8 2
appeared to act with little haste and had seemingly reliable information
that the victim was dead before they entered defendant's house, the
court held the initial entry valid under the emergency exception.'8 3 Po-
lice learned of the homicide from defendant's therapist. After picking
up the therapist, they drove to defendant's house. The therapist en-
tered the house alone. After a short interval, he came out and advised
police that he had found the body. Police then entered the house. De-
fendant returned home shortly after police entered his house and was
arrested immediately.' 84 The Martin court held that police were acting
in an emergency situation that fully justified their entry, despite the
therapist's report that the victim was dead and that no one else was in
the house.' 85
Similarly in Sallie v. North Carolina,'86 the court did not require po-
lice to rely on an informant's observations. A police officer went to
defendant's trailer park residence after hearing of defendant's arrival at
a hospital with a dead child. The officer learned from the trailer park
manager that no one knew the whereabouts of the dead child's sister. 8 7
The court held that a warrantless entry to check on the safety of the
missing sister was valid under the emergency exception,188 even though
the trailer park manager testified that she told the officer she had al-
ready checked defendant's trailer. 8 9 The court found that the officer
was not "required to rely on the thoroughness of her search or the accu-
racy of her report."' 90
To justify initial police entry, the court in State v. Epperson19 1 ap-
181. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
182. - S.D. -, 274 N.W.2d 893 (1979).
183. Id at -, 274 N.W.2d at 896-97.
184. Id at-, 274 N.W.2d at 894.
185. Id at-, 274 N.W.2d at 897.
186. 587 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1978).
187. Id at 638.
188. Id at 641. This case is a federal habeas corpus attack on a state conviction. The court
held that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), barred habeas corpus review of fourth amendment
claims because defendant received a full and fair hearing on these claims in the state courts. The
court, however, found that the search was constitutional, reaching the issue on sixth amendment
effective assistance of counsel grounds. 587 F.2d at 639-41.
189. 587 F.2d at 641.
190. Id
191. 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978).
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plied an extremely broad notion of emergency. The Missouri Supreme
Court held that forcible entry into Epperson's home was valid under.
the emergency exception despite a delay of two and one-half hours af-
ter police were first summoned.19 2 Police spent the two and one-half
hours attempting to locate defendant, investigating the inconsistent and
unlikely stories he had given during the previous several days to ac-
count for his missing wife and children, and persuading defendant's
father to break into the house for them.' 93  Procrastinated entry
notwithstanding,194  the court ruled, "the exigent circumstances
192. Id at 262-65. Defendant's mother-in-law alerted police. For several days before discov-
ery of the homicide, she had been attempting to get an explanation for the absence of her daughter
and grandchildren. She had gone to defendant's home on the morning of the police break-in at
defendant's invitation. She left, however, after defendant began behaving suspiciously and went
to a neighbor's home to call police. Id at 262. She told police that she had "detected an odor in
the house which, from prior experience, she associated with death.' Id When police arrived, no
one responded to their knocks, the doors were locked, and all windows were covered with blinds
or drapes. Id
193. 571 S.W.2d at 262-63. Shortly after first arriving at defendant's house, the police, after
consulting with their chief, decided that they did not have "legal authority to break into and
search." Brief for Appellant at 5, State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d (Mo. 1978). At the hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress, one of the officers testified that the chief had given orders not to
break into the house. Id at 272 (Seiler, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Epper-
son, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978).
194. In the reasoning that supports its finding that police entry into Epperson's house was
valid under the emergency exception, the court never referred to the two and one-half hour delay
between summons and entry. See 571 S.W.2d 263-65. The court employed a two part analysis to
reach its holding. First, the court considered "whether the facts were sufficient to establish exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless entry." Id at 263. The court ruled that police were aware
of sufficient facts to establish probable cause that a crime had been committed:
These facts include (1) the defendant's wife and children had been missing several days;
(2) defendant had given false and inconsistent explanations for their absence; (3) defend-
ant's unusual, suspicious and nervous manner in the days following the disappearance of
his family; (4) an odor of decomposing flesh had been detected in the house; and (5)
defendant's unexplained disappearance, though he had been in the house with Mrs.
Smith [the mother-in-law] shortly before the police arrived.
Id Although no one but defendant's mother-in-law detected the odor of death, the court found
that this smell, plus the other facts amounting to probable cause, justified entry under the emer-
gency exception. Id at 264. In the second part of its analysis, the court dismissed defendant's
challenge that police did not, in fact, believe that they were confronted with an emergency at
Epperson's house. The officers who broke in with defendant's father were, at best, uncertain that
they were facing an emergency. Even the court acknowledged that the officers believed they were
dealing with a missing persons investigation, although the officers "also considered the medical
emergency factors involved." Id at 265 (emphasis in original). The court, however, concluded
that the officers' subjective beliefs were irrelevant.
The second part of the court's analysis is troubling. The police officers who broke into defend-
ant's house certainly knew the facts that the court found amounted to probable cause to believe a
crime had been committed. Yet it is not apparent-and the court does not hold-that the officers,
in fact, believed that their knowledge amounted to probable cause or indicated that an emergency
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presented by this record justified the entry. . . as 'reasonable' under
the Fourth Amendment."'' 95
C. Scope-of-Search Cases After Mincey And Tyler
How post-Mincey courts will resolve the tension between Tyler and
Mincey when considering the permissible scope of a warrantless mur-
der scene search is less certain. Pre-Mincey courts that approved
searches unconfined by the emergency-in-fact' 96 seem plainly inconsis-
tent with Mincey. 197 Certainly Mincey overrules decisions permitting
more than one warrantless search of the murder scene.' 98 Yet, Tyler's
"reasonable time" holding' 99 is consonant with the pragmatic approach
of pre-Mincey courts that considered the scope of warrantless murder
scene searches. 2°
1. Cases Adopting the Tyler Standard
Predictably, two post-Mincey courts have invoked Tyler to justify
warrantless murder scene searches. Both cases, State v. Epperson20 !
and State v. Martin,2 °2 concerned searches following valid emergency
entries.2 °3 In Epperson, police discovered the victims immediately
confronted them. When considering the constitutionality of a warrantless search and seizure, a
court must consider the beliefs of the officers making the search. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21-22 (1968); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Note, supra note 60, at 620 n.96.
Although a court might find that the officers knew a collection of facts establishing an emergency,
it would be a nonsequitur to conclude that officers therefore believed they were faced with an
emergency. Even if a reasonable, prudent person would inevitably conclude that an emergency
existed from the facts that the court found the officers breaking into Epperson's house knew, it
does not necessarily follow that the officers believed in the existence of an emergency. The court,
however, apparently believed that the situation amounted to an emergency per se. See 571
S.W.2d at 271-72 (Seller, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Epperson focused squarely on the two and one-half hour delay and concluded
that the emergency exception was inapplicable. See 571 S.W.2d at 269-73 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
"A true emergency does not invite delayed action. The two are mutually inconsistent." Id at 271
(Seiler, J., dissenting).
195. 571 S.W.2d at 264.
196. See notes 28-51 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 168-72 supra and accompanying text.
198. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 173-75 supra and accompanying text.
200. See notes 28-51 supra and accompanying text.
201. 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978).
202. - S.D. -, 274 N.W.2d 893 (1979).
203. See State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Mo. 1978); State v. Martin, - S.D. -, 274
N.W.2d 893, 897 (1979).
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upon entry, seized instrumentalities of the crime from the bedroom
where the bodies were found, and checked the rest of the house, with-
out seizing any other evidence, to verify that no one else was there.2°4
The court held that this initial search was a valid emergency investiga-
tion for injured or missing persons and ruled that the seizures made in
the bedroom were valid under the plain view exception.20 5 Police,
however, made a second search of the house after they had ascertained
that neither defendant nor additional victims were in the house and
seized more plain view evidence.2"6 Epperson held that the second
search was "within the reasonable time, spatial scope and limited inten-
sity approved by Tyler. 2 °7 The court, therefore, found the second
seizures legitimate, summarily distinguishing Mincey on its facts.208
The great disparity in the intensity of the searches in Mince 2 °9 and
Epperson makes it difficult to consider the second search in Epperson
unreasonable. Yet, this second search does not seem to fall within
Mincey's concept of legitimate emergency activities.21 0 The only pur-
pose of the second search appears to have been the collection of more
evidence. Police must have been fairly certain before this search that
no one was in need of emergency assistance and that defendant was not
present. Moreover, the record does not indicate any threatened loss or
destruction of evidence.2 1' Apart from the less intrusive nature of the
searches, however, Epperson is distinguishable from Mincey in that the
same officers who made the initial entry made both searches of Epper-
son's house. In addition, the officer who stayed with the victim during
the first search made the second search.2 12 Finally, it seems quite rea-
sonable to construe "legitimate emergency activities" to encompass a
second check of the murder scene to verify that neither a well con-
cealed victim nor murderer has been overlooked. 1 3 This argument ap-
204. 571 S.W.2d at 263.
205. Id at 266.
206. Id at 263.
207. Id at 268.
208. Id at 268 n.2. "The facts in Mincey were clearly distinguishable from those in Tyler, or
those in the case at bar." Id
209. See note 116 supra.
210. See note 150 supra.
211. See 571 S.W.2d at 263, 268.
212. Id at 263.
213. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
406-07 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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pears especially persuasive when both searches are as limited as they
were in Epperson and the evidence seized was in plain view.
In Martin, the court cited Tyler to justify a warrantless murder scene
search of broader scope than the second search in Elperson.21 4 Al-
though the court detailed neither the precise duration nor extent of the
search, police appear to have searched the entire house for approxi-
mately four to five hours." 5 The search began after police found the
victim's body, determined that there were no other victims, and ar-
rested defendant." 6 The court ruled that the murder weapons were in
plain view during legitimate emergency activity immediately following
entry.217 As to all other evidence, the Martin court held that it was
seized during a search that, under Tyler, was a permissible continua-
tion of the initial search to locate the victim.2 18 In its conclusory appli-
cation of Tyler, the court made no attempt to distinguish Mincey or to
explain why it was inapplicable." 9 Given Martin's manifest inconsis-
tency with Mincey22° and its citation of Mincey as support for the valid-
ity of the initial entry,221 this less than careful analysis is perplexing.
The cursory treatment of Mincey in Epperson and Martin is disap-
pointing. Not only did these courts leave the tension between Tyler
and Mince 221 unresolved, they created new ambiguities of practical
significance as well. When the emergency-in-fact-the period during
which police know or reasonably believe that immediate action is nec-
essary to save or protect lives or to apprehend a dangerous criminal-
circumscribes the allowable scope of a warrantless murder scene
search, the boundaries of permissible scope are relatively precise.223
When a warrantless murder scene search may continue for a reason-
able time after the initially valid emergency entry, searchers may have
difficulty knowing what is permissible. As Justice White, dissenting in
214. See State v. Martin, - S.D. -, -, 274 N.W.2d 893, 894 (1979).
215. Id
216. Id
217. Id at -, 274 N.W.2d at 897.
218. Id
219. See id at -, 274 N.W.2d at 897. In its laconic discussion of the scope of the search, the
court does not mention or cite Mincey.
220. See notes 168-72 supra and accompanying text.
221. See - S.D. at -, 274 N.W.2d at 896. The court cites Mincey for the following proposi-
tion: "Equally settled law is the proposition that warrantless searches are permissible in emer-
gency situations." Id
222. See notes 168-75 supra and accompanying text.
223. See notes 168-72 supra and accompanying text.
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Tyler, observed, "Those investigating fires and their causes deserve a
clear demarcation of the constitutional limits of their authority. ' ' 224 To
the extent the imprecise "reasonable time" standard of the scope of a
warrantless murder scene search makes it difficult for police to conform
their behavior to the requirements of the fourth amendment, the stan-
dard is undesirable.
Arguably, the holding in Tyler is peculiar to fire scene investigations
and should not be applied to warrantless murder scene searches. Al-
though the decision in Tyler preceeded Mincey by three weeks, a unan-
imous Court in Mincey chose not to apply the "reasonable time" notion
to warrantless murder scene searches. 225 The Tyler Court offered three
reasons for its conclusions that a warrantless search for a reasonable
period following the extinguishment of a fire is constitutional: (1) the
need to prevent accidental or intentional loss or destruction of evi-
dence; (2) the need to minimize the interference with the owner's pri-
vacy; and (3) the need for prompt determination of the fire's origin in
order to prevent possible recurrence.226
The first reason announces no new constitutional doctrine; preserva-
tion of evidence is an existing exception to the warrant requirement.227
In Mincey, the Court noted that there was no threatened loss or de-
struction of evidence but cited this warrant requirement exception in its
enumeration of previously recognized exceptions.228 Especially in the
context of a murder investigation, Tyler's second reason, safeguarding
the owner's privacy, argues equally for the protections of a neutral and
detached magistrate 229 and of a warrant "particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ' 2 ° Only
the third reason, preventing a recurrence of the fire, seems persuasive
224. 436 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
225. See 437 U.S. at 390-95. Justice Rehnquist both concurred and dissented, but concurred
in the part of the majority's opinion concerning the murder scene exception. See id at 405 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. See 436 U.S. at 510.
227. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
228. See 437 U.S. at 394.
229. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Ld at 13-14.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of the need for a reasonable time period for investigation, but this rea-
son is clearly irrelevant to warrantless murder scene searches. 23t Tler,
therefore, offers no compelling reason for incorporating a "reasonable
time" notion into Mincey's adumbration of the permissible scope of a
warrantless murder scene search.
2. Cases Adopting the Mincey Standard
Three recent decisions have held that warrantless searches following
legitimate emergency entries exceeded the limits fixed by the emer-
gency-in-fact and Mincey. In Grant v. State, 2 32 police seized guns from
the floor near the victim's body in the living room, from under a bed in
an adjacent room, and from a closed dresser drawer in a bedroom. 233
Applying Mincey, the court ruled that the legitimate concerns that per-
mit a warrantless murder scene search could not justify the search of
the dresser drawer.234
United States v. Presler235 did not involve a murder scene search.
Concerned for defendant's well-being, his landlady summoned police
to investigate. She had not seen defendant for some time and had de-
tected an unusual odor emanating from his apartment. Police entered
the apartment and found defendant alive, showing no sign of injury,
but covered with blood that he apparently had vomited. After defend-
ant was removed to the hospital, police exhaustively searched the
apartment.236 The court held that, under Mincey, the search was inva-
lid from its inception.237 According to the court, the exigencies termi-
nated once defendant had been taken to the hospital. The court found
that the absence of any evidence indicating that a crime had occurred
in the apartment-as well as the absence of any reason to suppose that
defendant was a criminal-precluded any search.238
231. This reason is analogous lo a search of a murder scene to determine whether the mur-
derer is still on the premises. Mincey, however, allows police to verify that the murderer is no
longer present. See 437 U.S. at 392.
232. 374 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Defendant, who had been involved in an
altercation with his son that resulted in the son's death, summoned police. Id at 631.
233. 374 So. 2d at 631.
234. Id at 632.
235. 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979). Defendant was indicted and convicted of wire fraud based
on evidence seized during the search of his apartment following a legitimate emergency entry by
police.
236. Id at 1209.
237. Id at 1210.
238. Id at 1211. A crucial piece of evidence seized in defendant's apartment was a box con-
[Vol. 58:367
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The court in State v. Rogers23 9 also applied Mincey strictly. Police,
responding to a report of a dead body in defendant's home, entered
and verified that the victim was dead. After ascertaining that no one
was home, they called for an ambulance and then left the house to
question a small group gathered outside. Approximately twenty min-
utes after police first arrived, a second police contingent arrived and
conducted a thorough, three and one-half hour search of the house.2 40
The court ruled that the emergency-in-fact terminated before the arri-
val of the search party. In addition, the court held that nothing in the
record indicated a possibility of loss or destruction of evidence.2 4'
Holding that the search exceeded the limits fashioned in Mincey,242 the
court rejected the state's argument that a warrantless murder scene
search is constitutional if it follows a legitimate entry in response to a
report of a dead body and is both prompt and continuous.243 Rogers,
even more explicitly than Mincey, circumscribed the scope of a war-
rantless murder scene search by the emergency-in-fact.244 "Where the
exigency is a homicide, the entry is justified to find the victims and
perpetrators by a scan of the premises, and in the absence of other unu-
sual circumstances, ends there. '
245
taining money wrappers with bank identification numbers on them. The court held that the plain
view exception would not permit seizure of the wrappers. The court found that, even if the re-
quirement that evidence seized in plain view be immediately apparent as contraband or evidence
of a crime allowed a "brief perusal" of the box seized here, this perusal would still not indicate
that the money wrappers were evidence of a crime. Therefore, the plain view exception was inap-
plicable. Id. at 1211-12.
239. 573 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. 1978).
240. Id at 713.
241. Id at 714-15. "At the time the search by officers began, the premises were known to be
clear of occupants and were secure. There was no threat to the contents of the residence and no
cause for search without a warrant." Id
242. Id at 714-17.
243. Id at 714.
244. The Rogers court stated:
[Als a matter of constitutional principle, the emergency doctrine is not just another
means to justify a warrantless search but for entry into private premises to respond to
urgent need for aid or protection, promptly launched and promptly terminated when the
exigency which legitimates the police presence ceases. . . .The entry must be without
accompanying intent to search or arrest... and the investigation must be only as broad
as the exigency to which it responds.
Id at 716.
245. Id
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3. Reconciling Mincey and Tyler
Rogers derived its holding not only from Mincey but from Tyler and
Epperson as well.246 The court characterized both Tyler and Epperson
as approving seizures of plain view evidence before the emergency-in-
fact terminated.247 Rogers does not detail precisely the basis for its
conclusions about Tyler and Epperson, but its analysis evidences im-
plicit inferences about the reasoning in these cases. 248 Rogers reads Ep-
person as holding that the emergency-in-fact persisted through the
second search.2 49 Language in Epperson supports Rogers reading of
that case. Epperson asserted that the seizures during the second search
could not be justified under the plain view exception unless the second
search was a "continuation of the emergency search for injured or miss-
ing persons."25 Moreover, Epperson found that discovery of the vic-
tims heightened "the exigent quality of the moment."25' Yet Epperson
never explicitly stated that the emergency authorizing the initial entry
persisted through the second search.252 Rather, the court found that
the search and plain view seizures were within the "reasonable time,
spatial scope and limited intensity approved by Tyler. '25 3 Although it
seems plausible to believe that the emergency-in-fact in Epperson en-
dured beyond the initial check of the house,254 the Epperson Court did
not explicitly draw that conclusion.
In Tyler, the Supreme Court did not expressly state that the emer-
gency authorizing initial entry to fight the fire continued through the
later re-entries and searches.2 5 5 Rather, the Court held that the re-en-
tries and searches were within the "reasonable time" permitted for
searches following a fire.256 Therefore, Rogers' assertion that "[i]n
Tyler. . .the exigency continued when the evidence in plain view was
taken," is an inference about the Court's implicit reasoning.2 7 This
246. See id at 715-16.
247. Id at 716.
248. See id at 715-16.
249. Id at 716.
250. State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Mo. 1978).
251. Id at 268.
252. See id at 266-68.
253. Id at 268.
254. See notes 212-13 supra and accompanying text.
255. See 436 U.S. at 509-12.
256. See id at 509-11.
257. 573 S.W.2d at 716.
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inference, however, is plausible. In Tyler's pragmatic approach to fire
scene searches, both need to prevent loss or destruction of evidence and
need to prevent recurrence of the fire required a "reasonable time" to
search following a fire.25 Thus, Tyler bases its holding, at least in part,
on a recognition of the possibility of exigent circumstances. Further,
the Court stated that "[i]n determining what constitutes a 'reasonable
time to investigate,' appropriate recognition must be given to the exi-
gencies that confront officials serving under these conditions."2 59 Fi-
nally, the view that the "reasonable time to investigate" following a fire
encompasses a notion of continuing emergency accords with the often
cited statement of the limits of a warrantless search: "[A] warrantless
search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation.' "260
Rogers' reading of Tyler and Epperson, therefore, seems a permissi-
ble construction of the holdings in those decisions. More importantly,
the court's analysis reconciled the tension between Tyler and
Mincey.261 A warrantless fire scene search, like a warrantless murder
scene search, is circumscribed by the emergency that justified initiation
of the search. In Rogers' analysis the differences between Tyler and
Mincey concern the distinction between the emergency created by a fire
and the emergency created by a homicide. In the latter, the emergency-
in-fact comprises the period during which police know or reasonably
believe that immediate action is necessary to save or protect lives or to
apprehend a dangerous criminal. With respect to a fire, the emergency-
in-fact continues beyond the dousing of the flames; it endures for a
"reasonable time" following extinguishment of the fire. In Rogers'
view, therefore, Tyler's specific holding is apparently confined to fire
scene searches. Mincey, however, is the applicable precedent for a
murder scene search.
D. Mincey as an Obstacle to Obtaining a Warrant
Because police were involved in the shooting in Mincey, it is unlikely
that they would have lacked information sufficient to establish the req-
258. See 436 U.S. at 510. See also notes 226-31 supra and accompanying text.
259. 436 U.S. at 510 n.6.
260. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1968)). See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 168-75 supra and accompanying text.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
406 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:367
uisite probable cause for a search warrant to issue.2 62 Apparently in
only one other murder scene search case,263 however, were police pres-
ent when the crime was committed. Mincey, therefore, is the excep-
tional case. When discovery of a dead body does not make it
immediately apparent that a crime has been committed, 2 4 the limited
warrantless murder scene search permitted by Mincey might make it
difficult for police to acquire sufficient information to establish proba-
ble cause for further search.265 Similarly, the information police gather
during their "legitimate emergency activities," might fail to indicate
how, or by whom, the victim was killed, even if the police observe signs
of foul play. In this situation, the inability to particularly describe the
object of a proposed search266 might prevent issuance of a valid war-
rant.
One pre-Mincey decision, State v. Chapman,267 posed this probable
inability to obtain a warrant as one reason for sanctioning, under the
"right and duty" doctrine, warrantless murder scene searches of broad
scope.268 Mincey, however, apparently overruled the general "right
and duty" doctrine employed by pre-Mincey courts, 269 regardless
whether one finds Mincey's holding tempered by Tyler. The basis for
262. See 437 U.S. at 368-69. See also note 142 supra.
263. People v. Eckstrom, 34 Cal. App. 3d 996, 998, 118 Cal. Rptr. 391, 392 (1974).
264. The corpus delicti of homicide requires proof that the alleged victim was killed by the
criminal act of some other person. This proof requires that the deceased not be the victim of
natural or accidental causes or a suicide. See Perkins, The Corpus Delcli of Murder, 48 VA. L,
REv. 173 (1962).
265. Probable cause comprises facts and circumstances within the knowledge of police of
which they have reasonably trustworthy information and that are sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. See Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
266. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states in part: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."
267. 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969).
268. Id at 211. Although police in Chapman had strong evidence of foul play, they were
initially uncertain whether the victim had actually been murdered. Id The court, in using the
"right and duty" doctrine to justify the warrantless search, concluded that an attempt to obtain a
warrant would have been futile. Id See also Brown v. Jones, 407 F. Supp. 686, 691 (W.D. Tex,
1974):
The pointlessness of obtaining a search warrant at this juncture is made clear by the fact
that the authorities had no idea what they were looking for. Had a warrant been ob-
tained, it would be a sham, since the object of the search would have been so broad as to
be meaningless.
Id
269. See notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text.
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the general "right and duty" doctrine was the idea that murder created
a hyper-emergency demanding special police action.270 Mincey does
recognize homicide as an exigent circumstance per se.271 To the extent
that report of a homicide permits the reasonable belief that warrantless
entry is necessary to preserve or protect life or to apprehend a danger-
ous criminal,272 this exigent circumstance has significance under the
fourth amendment.273 Nevertheless, the Court was unwilling "to hold
that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exi-
gent circumstances of the kind that under the fourth amendment justify
a warrantless search. 274 In addition, Mincey declined to recognize the
public interest in the prompt investigation of homicide as an exigent
circumstance sufficient to justify a warrantless murder scene search.275
Consequently, pre-Mincey case law offering the general "right and
duty" doctrine as the basis of warrantless murder scene searches of
broad scope appears no longer to be good law. Thus, the Mincey limi-
tations on the scope of warrantless searches may apply to some situa-
tions, such as in Chapman, in which police might have difficulty
demonstrating probable cause to obtain a valid warrant.
If police obtain consent to search, however, they can avoid both the
narrow limits set by Mincey and potential inability to obtain a search
warrant.276 As the Court noted in Schneckloth v. Bustaronte,277 "In
situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence. ' 278 Nothing in Mincey appears to restrict the application of
the consent exception to murder scene searches. 279 Post-Mincey courts,
therefore, are likely to scrutinize the record for evidence of consent to
search, especially in situations in which the defendant and victims were
270, See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
271 See 437 U.S. at 394.
272. See id at 392.
273. Id at 394.
274. See id at 393-94.
275. Id
276. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that the Maine court in
Chapman could have found consent to search as a basis for its holding. Not only did defendant
admit police to the murder scene, but he also gave police permission to look around. Moreover,
defendant initially asserted that the victim died as a result of a fall. 250 A.2d at 205.
277. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
278. Id at 227.
279. See 437 U.S. at 388-95.
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joint occupants of the murder scene. Obviously, however, consent
searches are not possible in every situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen whether Mincey has so circumscribed warrant-
less murder scene searches that effective murder investigations will be
frustrated. One commentator suggests that Mincey might not prevent
"prompt and limited warrantless investigation by a coroner or medical
examiner. . .[of] the cause of a death."2 80 This approach finds sup-
port in some pre-Mincey cases. 281 The same commentator also finds
language in Mincey suggesting less stringent particularity requirements
when search warrants are sought for a murder scene.282 The practica-
bility of these suggestions, like the application of Minceys narrow
holding, no doubt, will be tested by future litigation.
Michael Dwyer
280. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 465 (1978). Given Mince/s narrow limits, warrant-
less searches by coroners or medical examiners might also be unconstitutional. The Court in
Tyler, however, proposed a type of administrative warrant for fire scene searches after the reason-
able time for warrantless searches has expired. See 436 U.S. at 511-512. This fire scene adminis-
trative warrant is something of a hybrid. Unlike a conventional administrative warrant, this
warrant would issue on a showing of specific knowledge about the place to be searched and would
be responsive to individual events. See id at 506-08. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Note, The Law of Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REv. 607
(1974); Note, The Law of Administrative Inspections. Are Camara and See SillAlive and Well?,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 313. The Tyler Court indicated, however, that the showing required for the
fire scene warrant would not be equivalent to the showing of probable cause traditionally needed
to obtain a warrant to search for evidence of a crime. See 436 U.S. at 505-09. See also note 265
supra. Theoretically, it might be possible for coroners and medical examiners to obtain a similar
type of warrant to search a murder scene when the permissible warrantless investigation leaves the
police unable to obtain a conventional search warrant.
281. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
282. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 466 (1978). See also State v. DeGraw, 26 Ariz,
App. 595,599,550 P.2d 641, 645 (1976) (indicating that Arizona's pre-Mincey murder scene excep-
tion had some relevance to the showing required for a search warrant for a murder scene).
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